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POINT I 
A STATEMENT THAT A STREET ADDRESS IS IN UTAH, 
WHEREAS IN FACT IT IS IN ARIZONA, IS A FALSE STATEMENT 
Defendant claims that he did not make a false statement or knowingly 
conceal a material fact. Br. Aple. at 6. However, he does not deny that the 
properties he has described in various registration applications as 385 W. Arizona 
Avenue, 785 W. Arizona Avenue, 385 N. Juniper Street, 385 N. Richard Street, and 
380 N. Juniper Street are located in Colorado City, Arizona. See Br. Aple. 6-9. Nor 
does he deny that, on those same registration applications, he represented that 
these properties are located in Hilldale, Utah. Id. A statement to the effect that 
property located in Arizona is located in Utah is a false statement. 
Of course, at the preliminary hearing the State is not required to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence that 
defendant made a false statement. The quantum of evidence necessary bind a 
defendant over for trial is "relatively low." State v. Clark 2001UT 9, ^  10,20 P.3d 
300 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To prevail at a preliminary 
hearing, the prosecution need only produce "believable evidence of all the 
elements of the crime charged." Id. at ^ 15 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). Moreover, in applying this standard, "the magistrate must view all 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." Id. at 10. 
This standard was amply satisfied here. Defendant's address is in Arizona; 
he stated that it was in Utah. Now it may be that" [a]n 'address' is not necessarily 
the same as one's 'domicile/" or that "Hildale and Colorado City physically 
comprise a single community," or that they "share one post office," or that an 
investigator located the real property despite the fact that defendant gave a false 
city and state. Br. of Aple. at 6-8. But "[f]acts are stubborn things," Hiller B. 
Zobel, The Boston Massacre 293 (1970) (quoting John Adams's summation in Rex 
v. Wemms), and 385 W. Arizona Avenue does in fact sit on the south side of the 
state line. So defendant's statement was false. 
2 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH MAKING A FALSE 
STATEMENT, NOT WITH CONFUSING HIS BONA FIDE 
RESIDENCE WITH HIS "DOMICILE," "SITUS ADDRESS/' 
"STREET ADDRESS," "MAILING ADDRESS," OR "ADDRESS 
INFORMATION" 
Defendant argues that he "cannot be subject to punishment for allegedly 
misrepresenting his "bona fide residence' when he was never asked to declare his 
residency." Br. Aple. at 13. This argument misperceives the elements of the crime 
with which defendant was charged. 
Defendant was charged with false evidences of title or registration under 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1315(2) (West 2004): 
It is a second degree felony for a person with respect to a motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to: 
(2) knowingly make a false statement or knowingly conceal a 
material fact in an application under this chapter;.. . . 
The application referred to is the application described in Utah Code Ann. § 41-
la-209(l) (West Supp. 2005) (" An owner of a vehicle subject to registration under 
this part shall apply to the division for registration on forms furnished by the 
division."). Thus, to bind defendant over for trial, the prosecution at minimum 
bore the burden of establishing probable cause to believe that defendant (1) 
knowingly (2) made a false statement (3) on an application to register a motor 
vehicle in the State of Utah. 
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The prosecution established that defendant made a false statement on his 
vehicle registration application. On each application, he stated that his street 
address was located in Utah, whereas in fact it is located in Arizona. Academic 
arguments about whether "there is a distinction between what is connoted by the 
word 'address' and the phrase 'bona fide residence/" or whether "the phrase 
'bona fide residence' refers to one's domicile," or whether "the phrases 'Situs 
Address/ 'Street Address/ 'Mailing Address/ and 'Address Information'... ask 
one to declare the state of his residency," or whether "the phrase 'Permanent 
Address'" does or "does not request the declaration of one's domicile," or 
whether "the phrase 'permanent address' has been held the equivalent of 'bona 
fide residence' or 'domicile,'" or whether "[tjhere are a number of rights and 
privileges that can only be legally exercised by bona fide residents of the state," 
or whether state registration application forms "never use the words 'reside/ 
'resident/ 'residency/ or 'domicile,'" Br. Aple. at 9-12, miss the point. None of 
these legal distinctions has any power to move 385 W. Arizona Avenue across the 
state line. 
Although the concept of "bona fide residence" is not an element or sub-
element of the charged crime, it is tangentially related to this case. A separate 
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statute specifies that the Utah vehicle application form must include the 
applicant's "bona fide residence": 
(2) The application for registration shall include: 
(b) the name, bona fide residence and mailing address of the 
owner, or business address of the owner if the owner is a firm, 
association, or corporation;.... 
§ 41-la-209(2)(b) (West Supp. 2005). However, defendant is not charged with 
violation of this statute. Indeed, it is not a criminal statute. It is a statute 
specifying the information the Division of Motor Vehicles should include in its 
registration application. See § 41-la-209(l) (West Supp. 2005). Whether DMV 
complied with this direction and requested the statutorily required information 
is immaterial here. Perhaps, as defendant suggests, DMV did not request 
defendant's address with sufficient precision. But whether it did or did not, 385 
W. Arizona Avenue is not located in Hilldale, Utah. Defendant thus made a false 
statement on the application, which is all he is charged with having done. 
Defendant's statements were not false because he gave his "bona fide 
residence" instead of his "domicile," or his "domicile" instead of his "Permanent 
Address," or his "Permanent Address" instead of his "bona fide residence." They 
are false because he gave an address that does not exist. 
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POINT III 
AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, THE LAW REQUIRES THE 
PROSECUTION TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE OF THE ELEMENTS OF 
THE CRIME CHARGED, NOT EVIDENCE OF WHAT THE 
MAGISTRATE BELIEVES TO BE THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY 
UNDERLYING THE CRIMINAL STATUTE 
Defendant argues that "the State has failed to produce any evidence from 
which fraudulent intent could be established either directly or by inference/7 Br. 
Aple. at 13. This argument fails for two reasons: because what it assumes is false, 
and because what it asserts is false. 
The argument assumes that the State had an obligation to produce evidence 
of fraudulent intent. It did not. "[T]o prevail at a preliminary hearing, the 
prosecution must . . . produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime 
charged/' Clark, 2001 UT 9, % 15 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). "Fraudulent intent" is not an element of the crime charged. 
Defendant was charged with eight counts of violating subsection (2) of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-la-1315. R. 1-3. Some variants of the crime of false evidences of 
title or registration—those found in subsections (1), (3), and (4)—do require a 
showing of fraud; other variants — those found in subsections (2), (5), (6), (7), and 
(8)-do not: 
It is a second degree felony for a person with respect to a motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer to: 
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(1) fraudulently use a false or fictitious name in an application for 
registration, a certificate of title, or for a duplicate certificate of title; 
(2) knowingly make a false statement or knowingly conceal a material fact 
in an application under this chapter; 
(3) otherwise commit a fraud in an application under this chapter; 
(4) alter with fraudulent intent a certificate of title, registration card, 
license plate, or permit issued by the division; 
(5) forge or counterfeit a document or license plate purporting to 
have been issued by the division; 
(6) alter, falsify, or forge an assignment upon a certificate of title; 
(7) hold or use a document or license plate under this chapter 
knowing it has been altered, forged, or falsified; and 
(8) file an application for a certificate of title providing false lien 
information, when the person named on the application as lienholder 
does not hold a valid security interest. 
§ 41-la-1315 (West 2004) (charged provisions emphasized). Subsection (2) 
requires only a knowingly made false statement. Id. The prosecution adduced 
evidence establishing probable cause that defendant knowingly made a false 
statement. 
Unable to defend the literal truth of his statements on the registration 
applications, defendant extrapolates from the statute a policy and argues that he 
did not violate that policy. See Br. Aple. at 17. He contends that "[t]he 
proposition that it is the duty of the judiciary to construe and enforce criminal 
statutes without regard to the underlying policies is absurd/' Br. Aple. at 17. 
Policy may indeed play a role in statutory interpretation, but defendant's 
approach places the cart before the horse. "The plain language controls the 
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interpretation of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity [does the court] look 
beyond the plain language to legislative history or policy considerations." Vigos 
v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2,1f 13, 993 P.2d 207. The plain language 
of the registration statute is unambiguous: "It is a second degree felony for a 
person with respect to a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to . . . knowingly 
make a false statement or knowingly conceal a material fact in an application 
under this chapter . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1315(2) (West 2004). To state 
that property located in Arizona is located in Utah is to make a false statement. 
This ends the inquiry. No foray into legislative history or policy considerations 
is necessary or appropriate. 
Defendant also contends that "[i]n the district court the State seemed to 
concede that Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1315(2) requires proof that the defendant 
act with fraudulent intent/7 Br. Aple. at 13 (citing R. 90:7-8). On the contrary, the 
prosecutor merely argued that "in this case, the state has proven that there is a 
bad motive/7 R. 90: 7. The fact that the State proved bad motive does not 
constitute a concession that "bad motive" must be grafted onto the statutory 
elements of the crime. It may indicate only that the prosecutor was 
concerned—justifiably, as it turned out—that the magistrate might do so. After 
all, defendant had argued in an earlier hearing that the prosecution had failed to 
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establish that defendant acted with fraudulent intent, as if that were an element 
of the crime. R. 89: 63. 
Not only does defendant's argument wrongly assume that fraudulent intent 
is an element of the charged crime, it also wrongly asserts that the State "failed 
to produce any evidence from which fraudulent intent could be established either 
directly or by inference/' Br. Aple. at 13. The evidence strongly supported the 
inference that defendant acted with fraudulent intent or with a bad motive. The 
magistrate himself saw in the evidence "an indication that it's much cheaper for 
Mr. Johnson to show that these are in Utah." R. 89: 61. The difference, he found, 
"is usually about $200 per vehicle." Id. A magistrate "must view all evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the prosecution." Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10. (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted) Here, the inference that defendant made false 
statements on the applications for the purpose of defrauding his home state out 
of registration fees is not only a reasonable inference, but the only reasonable 
inference. Not even defendant has suggested any good motive for his false 
statement that may be inferred from this evidence. Thus, even if fraudulent intent 
were an element of the crime, defendant should have been bound over. 
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Finally, defendant argues that "[a]n individual may be deemed a 'resident7 
for the purposes of the registration requirements of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act 
if he maintains a place of business in this state that bases and operates a motor 
vehicle here/' Br. Aple. at 17-18 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-202(l)(b)(i)(B)(I)) 
(West Supp. 2007). This is true. Indeed, the Act authorizes a broad array of 
alternatives to an applicant who wishes to qualify as a "resident" for purposes of 
vehicle registration. See § 41-la-202(l)(b)(i)(A) (WestSupp. 2007). Conspicuously 
absent from the list of alternatives, however, is the alternative defendant in fact 
chose: making a false statement on the vehicle registration application. That 
defendant might have achieved his apparent objective lawfully does not justify 
his crime. 
The magistrate's analysis here appears to have been colored by a policy 
disagreement with the Legislature. He acknowledged the only statutory purpose 
discernible from the face of the statute: "Utah has an interest in the sanctity and 
truthfulness of its records." R. 89: 65. But he added, "Whether or not it is so 
much to bring it to a second degree felony level is perhaps another issue." Id. 
It is indeed another issue, and one for the Legislature alone. As noted in the 
State's opening brief, courts "'have nothing to do with what the law ought to be. 
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[They] must be guided by the law as it is.'" State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992,994 (Utah 
App. 1993) (quoting Hanchett v. Burbidge, 59 Utah 127,135,202 P. 377,380 (1921)). 
The question at this stage is whether the evidence was sufficient to bind 
defendant over on the charged offenses. In making this determination, the 
magistrate's "discretion is limited,,, State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29,134,137 P.3d 787, 
and his concerns with the strictness of the statute are irrelevant. Those concerns 
may become relevant at a later stage in the proceedings, when the court enjoys 
more discretion. For example, if at the time of sentencing, the court, in light of all 
the circumstances, "concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction 
as being for that degree of offense established by statute, the court may enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (West Supp. 2007). With the consent 
of the prosecutor, the level of offense may even be reduced two degrees. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-402(3)(a) (West Supp. 2007). In addition, the sentencing court 
may suspend execution of any sentence imposed and place defendant on 
probation. However, the concerns that might inform a decision at that stage have 
no role at this stage. 
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution adduced some believable 
evidence of all the statutory elements of the charged crime. Nothing more is 
11 
required for bindover. The dismissal should therefore be reversed and the matter 
remanded for further proceedings. 
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